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Abstract— On the basis of archival materials first 
introduced into scientific circulation, they studied the 
problem of the oil industry evolution in the 1920-ies, 
the specifics of the forms and methods of party-state 
management. The results of the activity and the role 
of the most prominent specialists who were the 
members of the Petroleum Industry Council at that 
time based on the supply chain management. During 
this period, the oil industry had great centralization 
of management, private capital was almost not 
allowed, self-financing was implemented to a 
minimum. Only oil trusts were to transfer all 
products to the industry syndicate. At the same time, 
archival documents allow not only to evaluate the 
colossal efforts of experts to restore and re-equip the 
industry, but also its importance for the development 
of the entire national economy in the context of the 
new economic policy implementation, make it possible 
to formulate the conclusion that by the end of the 
1920-ies own research and development for the oil 
industry has become a fairly voluminous list. 
Keywords— oil industry, new economic policy, supply 
chain management, Oil Industry Council.  
1. Introduction 
Companies must choose suppliers to provide the 
goods and services needed to create their product. 
The search for the most optimal development 
strategy for Russia at present, the severity of 
discussions regarding our past, present and future, 
the study of a number of previously unpublished 
archival documents, the appearance of publications 
that contain various assessments of the economic 
policy of the Soviet period of Russian history and 
the role of the so-called oil and gas factor in it [1], 
make the problem of finding mechanisms for the 
technical re-equipment of the oil industry of the 
USSR extremely urgent, in particular, during the 
1920-ies and 1930-ies and the post-war years. A 
number of researchers associate the high rates of 
Soviet reconstruction, forced industrialization and 
the post-war restoration of the national economy 
with the borrowing of Western scientific and 
technological achievements, and the massive 
supply of foreign equipment [2].  
The historical experience of oil industry 
reconstruction, the involvement of leading 
scientists and experts in the search for optimal 
mechanisms of its management, in the development 
of the conceptual foundations of socio-economic 
policy is extremely valuable for modern Russia, as 
it allows you to learn lessons, accumulate 
everything that is effective and fully understand the 
specifics of the Russian modernization model [3,4]. 
2. Materials and Methods 
Over the last twenty years, the supply chains of 
manufacturers and retailers have become ever more 
tightly linked. In many industries, retail sales 
trigger replenishment orders to manufacturers. 
Manufacturers with a well-tuned, just-in-time 
supply chain can automatically restock retail 
shelves as products are sold.  As collaboration has 
increased, additional data from supply chain 
partners has allowed companies to use advanced 
analytic tool to further improve results. The 
problem of organizational and legal foundation of 
state management development in the industrial 
sphere during the 1917-1930-ies was not 
comprehensively studied in the Soviet historical 
and legal science. The works [5] were devoted to 
the implementation of the economic functions of 
the state, and the main tasks of NEP [3]. The works 
[4] analyzed the prerequisites for the emergence of 
trusts, syndicates, joint-stock companies, their role 
in the structure of industrial organization was 
evaluated quite objectively. Of the later 
publications, the work “State and legal regulation 
of private capital in the national economy of the 
USSR during the early years of the NEP (1921-
1925)” was of particular interest for our study [5], 
in which, in particular, they considered various 
aspects of state influence on private capital. 
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The current stage of the problem domestic 
historiography is characterized by the author's 
attempt to make broader analytical generalizations 
and use various theoretical and methodological 
approaches. A number of works appeared in which 
issues that previously did not attract the attention of 
researchers were considered. So, some authors, 
analyzing the problem of administrative-command 
or adaptive-democratic methods of economic 
system management effectiveness, admit that 
during certain periods the former provided very 
good results in economic, scientific and cultural 
development [6]. 
A significant part of modern historical and legal 
works confirms the conclusion that the problem of 
conceptual and organizational and legal foundation 
establishment concerning the implementation of the 
new economic policy and forced industrialization, 
the legal regulation of party-state management of 
industry is underdeveloped [7]. The works of 
authors involved in the history of the oil industry 
are of no less interest [8]. 
The article adopted the modernization theory as a 
base. The specifics of the Russian model of 
modernization lies in its catch-up, military-
political, and largely “borrowing” character, which 
determined the special role of the state in its 
acceleration, progressive centralization, and 
mobilization management methods. 
3. Result 
During the post-revolutionary period, the 
establishment of state control over the production, 
distribution and consumption of petroleum 
products, as well as the profit of enterprises, was a 
prerequisite for the nationalization of the oil 
industry. On March 2, 1918, the Oil Commissariat 
was established, but in May of this year it was 
abolished and the Main Oil Committee 
(Glavkoneft) was created, which was called upon to 
control and regulate the entire (private) oil industry 
and trade in oil products; to develop and implement 
the measures related to the transfer of the industry 
and manufactured product trade into state 
ownership [9]. On June 20, 1918, the Council of 
People's Commissars immediately approved the 
"Decree on the Nationalization of the Oil Industry" 
[10]. There was no foreclosure to the previous 
owners. 
However, due to the civil war and intervention, oil 
was not sent from Baku to Soviet Russia during the 
whole 1919. The Sovnarkom disposed of the small 
oil reserves. In 1920, the nationalization of the 
industry was carried out again in the Baku region, 
but it was difficult to establish the proper operation 
of wells and drilling facilities in 1920-1921 [11]. In 
1920, authorities appeared managing oil production 
in the field: in Grozny, - the Central Oil 
Administration, and in Baku, - the Azerbaijan Oil 
Committee.  
According to the Decree of February 23, 1920, 
military discipline was introduced at industrial 
enterprises, the violation of which threatened the 
concentration camp in the worst case, factory 
committees were abolished, management was 
entrusted to the director alone [12]. However, in 
1920 the Decree was not respected, the crafts were 
united in 9, then in 6 district administrations, each 
of them was headed by a board of 3 members. 
Separate crafts were also headed by the head and 2 
assistants. Unity was not introduced until August 
1921 [13]. The new business units did not have any 
economic independence, oil and oil products were 
supplied free of charge, workers were given 
rations, and the material and technical and food 
supplies were very poor [14]. The commission 
specially directed there at the end of 1920 called 
the labor shortage, above all, qualified; decline in 
discipline, labor productivity; poor logistics and 
food supplies; perverse tariff policy as the reasons 
for the catastrophic situation with oil production 
[15]. 
The fuel and food crisis led to the rejection of “war 
communism” policy. On February 14, 1921, the 
Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (B) 
discussed the situation of the oil industry and 
decided on the measures for its restoration. 
However, in 1921, it was possible to produce only 
3.8 million tons of oil, that is, as much as in 1890 
[16]. The staff shortage remained one of the most 
serious problems. The state of oil field 
development after their nationalization was such 
that the most important task was the fight against 
technologically unjustified mass flooding of oil 
wells and reservoirs [17]. 
On October 20, 1921, everything was abolished, 
including Glavneft and the fuel heads [18]. The 
Board of the Oil and Shale Industry was created as 
the part of the General Directorate of Fuel (GDF). 
However, GDF did not exist for long either, and in 
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the summer of 1923 it was merged with the 
General Directorate of Mining. The General 
Directorate of Fuel was allowed to sell 25% of oil 
or oil products independently. For oil enterprises, 
the supply of petroleum products to the state was 
extremely ruinous, however, since the end of 1921, 
they began to record oil production growth [19]. 
During the 1920-ies there were three largest all-
Union trusts in the oil industry - Azneft, Grozneft 
and Embaneft, each of which had considerable 
independence in resolution of many issues. Each of 
the trusts united oil producing, refining, 
engineering and service enterprises, but they did 
not have the right to sell their products on their 
own, they did not become independent market 
entities. Mining and processing was detached from 
transportation. Nefteesindikat concluded contracts 
for the transportation of oil cargo with shipping 
companies and railways, and tariffs turned out to be 
very high [20]. 
At the Supreme Economic Council, the activity of 
oil trusts was regulated by the central 
administrative board, and its name changed 
repeatedly. In 1926–1929 it was the Main Mining 
and Fuel and Geological and Geodetic Directorate 
of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR, in 
which the Directorate of the Oil Industry existed. 
The department regulated the activity of oil trusts, 
being one of the central administrative boards of 
the Supreme Economic Council. Neftesindikat was 
engaged in the sale of oil at domestic and foreign 
markets. The directives of these departments, as 
well as the directives of the highest governing 
bodies, were subject to mandatory enforcement. 
The pace of the oil industry development, the ratio 
of oil and coal production were subject to strict 
regulation. Economic considerations were not a 
priority. For a long time, there was an imbalance in 
payment for manufactured products, often 
unprofitable for oil enterprises, but not for 
Neftesindikat [21]. Prices were set by the State 
Planning Commission for planned consumers at the 
level below production cost [22]. These problems 
were repeatedly pointed out by the most prominent 
expert and organizer of the industry, I.M. Gubkin, 
and the leaders of the oil trusts [23]. 
Due to the tremendous importance of oil export for 
the country, as the documents we have studied 
demonstrate, during the first years of the new 
economic policy implementation, oil experts were 
given a certain independence in order to restore the 
industry and perform its reconstruction quickly. So, 
in 1922 the Council of the Oil Industry (COI) was 
created, the chairman of the Presidium of which 
was I.M. Gubkin. The COI was engaged in 
coordination of oil issues between trusts, studying 
the state of affairs in the oil industry, developing 
the prospects for its development, and in 
introduction of mineral exploration geophysical 
methods. Such a body did not exist in any branch 
of Soviet industry. 
It is of interest that in October 1923 the COI 
decided to believe that the oil industry was 
embarking on new paths, changing the old, "fuel 
oil" nature of production [24]. At the same time, 
the council members referred to America, where it 
was considered an economic crime to burn oil 
under boilers. The Council emphasized that the 
change of milestones does not come from the 
offices, but from the crafts themselves. The 
conclusion of the Council after discussing the 
report of the famous scientist, the oilman V.I. 
Frolov, was the following one: “Pessimism should 
be set aside”. They decided to publish the report, 
but contrast the conclusions of the Council of the 
Oil Industry as a preface to its work, motivating it 
with digital data and economic conclusions [25]. 
The conclusion was signed by I.M. Gubkin, who 
was people's commissar indeed, an amazing 
organizer who knows how to get carried away and 
to carry along with him. 
The Scientific and Technical Bureau of the Council 
of the Petroleum Industry played a huge role in the 
technical re-equipment of the industry, which has 
actually functioned since October 1923, although 
its Regulation was approved by the Council on 
November 14, 1923. They determined 2 directions 
in its activity: research of various aspects of oil 
field development; Ongoing work consisting in the 
consideration of various issues submitted to the 
Technical Bureau. 
The nature of the Bureau activities can be 
represented by its report study. So, during the 
operational year 1923/24 at the meeting of the 
Bureau, which was chaired by I.I. Davydov at that 
time, they considered the issues related to the 
studies of falling production in the Grozny district 
and on Bibi-Heybat Square in the Baku region, the 
clarification of flooding effect on the debit of wells. 
In particular, tables were compiled for the drop of 
production rates on Bibi Heybat and the 
chronological curves for production rate drop in the 
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Novo-Groznensky and Staro-Groznensky districts 
[26]. In addition, the members of the Bureau were 
involved in the examination of the inventions 
related to petroleum engineering or related to the 
oil industry. So, for example, the invention by V.K. 
Borisevich - the chisel “fish tail”, adapted for 
drilling columns, passable rocks, in combination 
with a device for rock column extraction without 
lifting the rod pipes. According to the conclusion of 
the Technical Commission of the Bureau, the 
invention was of undoubted technical interest, but 
its verification was required in [27]. 
Mostly, manufacturers’ focus on several projects 
for supply chain visibility is to equipping more 
accurate, precise, faithful, and rigorous real-time 
portrait of demand, quality, and price indications or 
information about supplier’s inventory levels [28]. 
The Technical Bureau developed a list of scientific 
topics in five departments of oil business: geology, 
drilling, oil and gas production, oil refining, oil 
depots and oil transportation. The list included 73 
relevant topics, the SNR were published in a 
circular letter and sent to oil districts, educational 
institutions, etc. The work performed on a 
particular topic and adopted by the expert 
Commission was subject to payment depending on 
the assessment of work. The 1st category of work 
was estimated by 80 rubles., the 2nd - by 50 rubles 
and the 3rd - by 35 rubles per printed sheet [29]. 
On September 18, 1924 during the meeting of the 
Oil Industry Council Gubkin made a proposal to 
establish a research petroleum institute at the 
Moscow Mining Academy. The Council supported 
his idea [30]. In 1925, within the framework of the 
Scientific and Technical Department (STD) of the 
Supreme Economic Council the State Oil Research 
Institute (SORI), headed by I. Gubkin, was 
established as the leading branch in the industry. 
There were three departments in SORI: Geological 
exploration, Production-Mechanical, Chemistry 
and Petroleum Technology. Archival documents 
allow us to judge the results of SORI during the 
first years of its existence. Thus, in the resolution 
of the Scientific and Technical Council of the Oil 
Industry on the verification of the institute work by 
a specially created commission, the development of 
“the basic principles of the rational formulation of 
the Union oil business through the collective work 
of scientific and technical forces” was defined as 
one of the institute main tasks. SORI was designed 
to combine the research work of district institutes 
and laboratories and to solve practical issues. The 
Presidium of the STC emphasized the absolute 
need for the existence of SORI in Moscow. 
Assessing its work as a whole positively, the 
Council noted that the number of research papers of 
practical importance for the oil industry of the 
USSR was not enough. Among the promising 
projects were the works which started to study the 
water of oil fields, without which it was impossible 
to develop oil fields and combat the flooding of 
productive formation properly [31]. 
In the field of improving the methods for oil 
industry waste processing and utilization, the 
attempts have been made to solve the difficult task 
of acid tar utilization and oil refining. The method 
developed by SORI was tested at a semi-factory 
installation of Embaneft plants. In addition, it was 
of interest to work in the field of the cracking 
process at a semi-factory installation of the 
Shukhov-Borton type, which allow us to hope for a 
successful resolution of the cracking problem on 
the devices constructed exclusively from domestic 
materials. At the same time, it was noted that the 
work in this trend was delayed due to the lack of 
funds. One of the promising projects was the use of 
liquid sulphurous acid to refine petroleum products 
using the Edelean method [32]. 
The documents also testify to a number of 
shortcomings in the activity of SORI, which were 
pointed out by the experts of the Scientific and 
Technical Council: insufficient coordination of 
SORI activities with the local research work; the 
lack of awareness of trusts and a wide range of 
practitioners of the oil industry in respect of SORI 
work; the discrepancy between the volume of work 
being carried out at SORI and the needs of the oil 
industry in research work [33]. 
At the same time, the STC could not fail to note 
“extremely abnormal working conditions” of 
employees: lack of equipment, extremely cramped 
and uncomfortable rooms. A significant number of 
installations (airlift, the equipment for testing the 
operation of pressure transmission valves in the 
sand, studying the recovery of oil reservoirs) were 
located in the cold stairwell of the Mining 
Academy. Oil pumping and grouting cement 
studies were carried out in a cold, dark, damp 
basement, which affected the health of working 
employees. The shortage of precision measuring 
instruments and equipment made research 
extremely difficult; time was spent on invention of 
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surrogates for these devices. The mechanical 
workshop at SORI did not satisfy the need for their 
manufacture. Meanwhile, the building for SORI 
was built, but the completion of construction was 
difficult due to the lack of funds. In addition, other 
NTU institutes encroached on it. 
The scientific and technical department insisted on 
the need to provide the SORI with such a room that 
would ensure the full development of the Institute 
work, as well as equip it with the necessary 
equipment and staff. At Mechanical-Industrial 
department of STC, such particularly urgent works 
were represented by the studies related to deep 
pumps, metal fatigue used in the oil industry, 
casing resistance to external pressure, as well as the 
work on the use of stainless iron for oil industry 
equipment and this equipment standardization [34].  
On October 28, 1924, an experimental station was 
created at the Research Institute of the Oil Industry 
Council, designed to study the movement of oil 
through pipes in order to derive scientifically based 
formulas for oil pipeline calculation for various 
types of Russian oil [35]. 
One of the most important areas of the Council 
work, which was of keen interest for the central 
governing bodies, was the analysis of the oil 
industry state in the United States and the 
organization of research work there. The Council 
had to propose a number of topics for their 
development by the members of the Society of 
Russian Engineers in the USA, so that it would be 
possible to publish these materials in the form of 
monographs. In 1925, the Council proposed to 
publish American Technology magazine, which 
was to be funded by interested institutions. The 
members of the SNP were called to become the 
authors of these publications. 
The Council developed safety rules, and the rules 
adopted by the Mining Department in 1915 were 
adopted as the basis. The fact that the problems of 
developing compliance with safety procedures and 
the protection of the subsoil were more than 
relevant is proved by the organization of a special 
Conference on the Protection and Rational Use of 
Oil Subsoil, which the Presidium of the Supreme 
Economic Council of the USSR decided to convene 
in November 1925. The representatives of the 
exploration and production departments, oil trusts, 
STC, the Scientific and Technical Department of 
the Supreme Economic Council, the Geological 
Committee, the Mining Directorate of the Central 
Administration of State Industry of the Supreme 
Economic Council, the heads of the Mountainous 
Districts, and other oil business experts on the 
protection and rational use of oil-bearing subsoil by 
the following program were invited to this meeting. 
They discussed the reports from the field, and the 
plan, and the principles of rational development of 
exploited promising areas. They demanded 
consideration of measures to combat the flooding 
of oil fields, the issues of basic provision 
development to protect oil fields from flooding, the 
measures for the protection and use of gases, and 
the program for geological exploration in oil-
bearing areas. One of the most urgent issues was 
the issue of setting up state-wide experiments on 
the use of geo- and radiophysical methods of oil 
field exploration. 
To consider the measures relating to the protection 
of oil field subsoil from flooding and rational 
development of the latter, the Central Geological 
and Technical Commission for the Protection of 
Oil Fields, as well as the regional fishing 
commissions - Balakhanskaya, Sabunchanskaya, 
Romaninskaya, Surakhanskaya, Bibi-Heybatskaya 
and Binagadi, - were approved in Baku. The 
Central Geological and Technical Commission 
with a decisive vote included the representatives of 
the Mining Supervision, the Geological Exploration 
Bureau of Azneft, the Central Department of 
Crafts, the Technical Bureau of Azneft, the Union 
of Miners and regional geologists. 
The Council of the Petroleum Industry actively 
opposed the attempts to concentrate the personnel 
of the geological exploration departments of 
enterprises in a certain central body and argued that 
the experts in geology at oil trusts are the same 
industrial and technical staff needed for production 
as other experts: chemists, mechanics, electrical 
engineers, heating engineers, surveyors etc.: “If the 
management of each of these experts were taken 
from Neftetrest and transferred to some central 
organizations - oil trusts as industrial enterprises 
should have stopped working”. At that, it was 
proposed to submit draft programs of all the works 
of the exploration departments to the Supreme 
Economic Council for coordination, and send 
copies to the Geological Committee and at the 
same time to its local departments. The Geological 
Committee should send representatives to the 
meetings of the Supreme Economic Council at 
which these programs would be considered. The 
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Council categorically stated that only the head of 
the oil trust could appoint geologists, but not the 
Geological Committee. The Council, insisting on a 
certain independence of the oil trusts, while 
simultaneously demonstrating the nature of the 
relationship with the Geological Committee, 
believed that “even if the Geological Committee 
has a desire to influence the life of the oil trusts, it 
can fulfill this desire through its representatives in 
the Geological and Technical Commissions, whose 
representatives have a decisive vote in the 
regulations on these commissions”. 
The leadership of the Petroleum Industry Council 
considered it is necessary to emphasize, 
strengthening the argument of the thesis in favor of 
the independence of the geological departments of 
the oil trusts, that their work was not scientific, but 
purely practical, industrial in nature, and this 
significantly differed from the tasks of their 
activities and initiative differed from the work and 
tasks of the Geological Committee and its local 
branches. Therefore, the Geological Committee 
could not be a competent body, from the point of 
view of the Council, as well as in the issues of 
persons capable of administrative leading of these 
departments, performing important production, 
technical and, at the same time, narrowly practical 
work. 
The significance of the Council for the oil industry, 
the results and plans for the development of the 
industry are evidenced by the data presented in the 
report “The Situation and Immediate Prospects of 
Oil Business in the USSR”, which was recorded by 
I.M. Gubkin at a meeting of the SNP on January 
19, 1927. The report is a serious, complete analysis 
of the general state of the oil industry during the 
years of the new economic policy, carried out by a 
leading industry expert and addressed to specialists, 
and therefore is an invaluable source. In particular, 
it contained data on oil production volumes 
(1925/26), which throughout the Union amounted 
to 90.5% of the production of 1913, and it almost 
doubled separately for Grozny. The role of fountain 
production in two main areas - Baku and Grozny - 
also increased significantly. According to I.M. 
Gubkin, another feature of oil production in recent 
years is its increase with deep pumps due to 
borehole production decrease. The introduction of 
old wells into production, the so-called “renewed” 
wells, was named as one of the factors determining 
the “unprecedented production growth”. But, 
mainly, the rise was nevertheless, from the 
speaker’s point of view, due to increased drilling: 
in 1925/26, the penetration in the Baku region 
exceeded the penetration of 1913 by 11.0%, and by 
29% in Grozny. But the drilling efficiency 
decreased every year. The figures voiced in the 
report testified to a significant and progressive 
depletion of production lands, the need for 
immediate implementation of industrial oil 
exploration on a large scale. I.M. Gubkin especially 
insisted on this conclusion. 
The author of the report dwelled separately on the 
achievements and problems associated with oil 
refining, which grew in parallel with production 
increase, but the capital costs of production lagged 
significantly behind industrial costs, which brought 
refining to critical condition along with the pre-
revolutionary technical backwardness of factories: 
the enterprises operating at that time did not meet 
the requirements of that time. They needed fast 
reconstruction and the construction of new ones. 
Otherwise, the use of increasing oil production 
would be impossible. I.M. Gubkin argued that “a 
correct and quick resolution of the oil refining issue 
as would be required on the merits” and “a 
significant revision of the basic view of the oil 
industry” was necessary. The point was that the 
historically formed view of the oil industry as a 
fuel industry should have been recognized as 
obsolete and untrue. Indeed, even in pre-
revolutionary Russia, there was “oil imbalance” in 
the energy sector. Due to the low percentage of 
kerosene extraction from oil and oil residue 
burning under steam boilers I.A. Dyakonova rightly 
characterized the type of energetics that prevailed 
at that time in Russia as energy waste. 
In 1927, I.M. Gubkin argued that the industry 
would remain the supplier of oil fuel for a long 
time, but this was only because it took a long time 
to restructure it fundamentally: “The supply of oil 
is not the goal of the oil industry, its goal is to 
supply the market (internal and external) with light, 
high-grade oil products; oil should not be 
considered a by-product”. So as the capacity of the 
domestic market in relation to light petroleum 
products was limited in the 1920-ies, the 
importance of petroleum product export was 
highlighted, according to the speaker. At that time, 
oil export was determined to be the main task of the 
oil industry, or at least equivalent to oil product 
supply to the domestic market. In his opinion, 
awareness of this task would determine the final 
and unconditional solution of the “long-term” issue 
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of the pipeline construction from Baku-Grozny to 
the Black Sea coast. In turn, this decision would 
accelerate the construction of refineries. 
The speaker planned that a certain amount (up to 
30-40 million pounds) of oil fuel produced at the 
Black Sea refineries will be exported abroad, 
despite the fact that there will be a need for fuel 
inside the country. However, the exported oil could 
be replaced profitably, if necessary, with foreign 
coal imported through northern ports. 
Considering the evolution of oil export in Soviet 
Russia, I.M. Gubkin cited the following data: in 
1924/25, oil export exceeded the figure of 1913 
(948.3 thousand tons) by 43.6%. The oil export 
results of 1925/26 exceeded those of 1913 by 
69.5%. In addition to volume, the oil export of the 
mid-1920-ies began to differ significantly from the 
prewar one also by composition. Instead of 
kerosene, gasoline became the main export 
commodity; export value of lubricating and solar 
oils more than doubled. The export of kerosene and 
lubricating oils decreased not only relatively, but 
also absolutely. 
The analysis of oil exports carried out by I.M. 
Gubkin is extremely interesting in the context of 
the current foreign policy situation: “The growth of 
our oil export took place, as is well known, in an 
extremely unfavorable political situation, and if it 
nevertheless took place, moreover, at the above-
described pace, then this undoubtedly indicates that 
the foreign market is extremely needed our 
petroleum products and this is true. Two 
circumstances that outweigh all political 
considerations and combinations will solve the 
issue in favor of our oil export development: the 
growth of industry, and especially the growth of 
motorism and aviation, on the one hand, and the 
depletion of oil reserves in the United States. There 
is no need to draw exaggeratedly bleak prospects 
for American oil reserves, but, without a doubt, the 
increase of oil consumption in America and the 
depletion of the well-known oil fields of North 
America, put the dominant position of American oil 
export into question. Thus, it is impossible, of 
course, to think that fate gives oil export to our 
hands without any efforts on our part in this regard, 
but without a doubt our respective measures open 
up the wide possibility of a very cost-effective oil 
export for an uncertain future”. 
Among the main events that can determine the 
success of Soviet oil export, I.M. Gubkin named 
the following: improvement of the trade apparatus 
abroad; provision of oil exports with the necessary 
volumes of oil products; lowering the cost of oil 
products, also through the construction of oil 
pipelines and the Black Sea plants. 
Thus, archival documents confirm that the Council 
of the Oil Industry discussed the most pressing 
problems of the industry: results, plans, carried out 
their adjustment, and searched for the most 
effective implementation mechanisms. The issues 
of industry management optimization were also 
discussed. So, on January 20, 1927, at the meeting 
of the Council's Scientific and Economic Bureau, 
the head of the Scientific and Economic Bureau of 
the Council of the Oil Industry V.I. Frolov 
proposed to change the forms of oil industry 
management. Among the necessary measures “in 
the interests of labor division principle 
implementation, in the interests of an extremely 
complex oil economy” he named the creation of a 
“demarcation line” between the governing bodies 
(VSNH) and the economic ones (trust, syndicate): 
“The governing body gives the task, general 
directives, has the right and duty to monitor the 
implementation of these tasks and directives, the 
right to conduct an audit, but not interfere in 
operational business activities in any way. The 
economic body (trust, syndicate) conducts the 
economic activity as an authorized owner with 
appropriate responsibility for his actions". In his 
report, he emphasized that the oil industry is not 
only the extractive industry, but also the 
manufacturing one, not only mining, fuel and 
chemical, but mainly export one. And in terms of 
the value of its products, and the amount of capital 
costs, and most importantly - in terms of task 
volume and significance that it was called upon to 
fulfill, in its economic and political importance, it 
should be allocated to a special body, directly 
subordinate to the Presidium of the Supreme 
Economic Council. Therefore, he offered the 
creation of a special body of the Supreme 
Economic Council - the Main Oil Directorate, 
which would solve the following tasks: 
development of a common development strategy 
for the oil industry; consideration and approval of 
economic plans submitted by oil trusts and 
Nefteesindikat; consideration and approval of 
estimates and reports of oil trusts; appointment of 
the board of oil trusts and Nefteesindikat; 
determination and submission of capital 
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expenditures, production, processing, export, 
prices, taxes, wages to the highest state bodies; 
ongoing monitoring of program performance by oil 
trusts without the right to intervene in operational 
activities, with the exception of cases of detected 
crimes; subsequent revisions. 
The report suggested that the observance of oil 
trusts would be exercised by reviewing the oil trust 
reports, as well as by the visits of the relevant 
representatives of the Office. From the point of 
view of the speaker, it would be advisable to create 
an Office for the import supply of oil industry with 
materials and equipment by the representatives of 
the oil trusts. It was proposed that Neftetrest Office 
would be headed by colleges (boards), and the 
principle of one-man management would be 
introduced in the Office of individual industrial 
units that make up the trust. 
According to V.I. Frolov, the organization of 
Neftesindikat was supposed to be changed "in the 
direction of strengthening the influence of oil trusts 
and a greater linkage of trade and production." The 
Oil Industry Council, which had the task of 
representing the common interests of the oil 
industry and the scientific development of technical 
and economic issues of the oil business, was 
planned to be left in its existing form with the 
actual strengthening of its representative functions, 
in accordance with the Charter of the Council 
approved by the Supreme Economic Council. 
These messages formed the basis of the report of 
the Scientific and Economic Bureau addressed to 
the deputy chairman of the Supreme Economic 
Council of the USSR M.L. Rukhimovich signed by 
I.M. Gubkin and V.I. Frolov. But substantial 
additions were introduced into it, in particular, the 
comparative analysis of oil production in the Baku 
and Grozny regions. The situation of the oil 
industry was described as follows: “Achievements 
are different in two most important oil districts, the 
Baku and Grozny: the production of 1925/26 in 
Grozny is 2 times greater than in 1913, the Baku 
production is still far from the pre-war level (74.9 
%)”. 
In the conclusion of a very lengthy report, a brief 
description of the situation of the oil industry for 
that period was given, its significance for 
industrialization was determined, and the main 
problems were listed. It was emphasized that the 
Soviet oil industry had a dangerous defect in the 
development disproportionality of some of its most 
important parts: while oil production and 
production drilling unfolded widely, the necessary 
industrial exploration of new oil lands, the 
construction and reconstruction of oil refineries 
and, in particular, the transportation of oil products 
were in a state far from modern requirements. They 
emphasized the need to eliminate these blocking 
factors “in the most decisive and quickest way”. 
Referring to the performed calculations, the 
members of the Bureau of the Council argued that 
the oil industry would not be able to manage its 
own resources carrying out the abovementioned 
tasks, it needed to attract capital from outside. The 
only source of this attraction was government 
funding. 
 The reason for such an “abnormal phenomenon” 
was also indicated, when a profitable oil industry 
found itself in the position of state funding need. 
From the point of view of experts, this was the 
result of “the incorrect application of cost 
accounting principle”: due to incorrect calculation 
of the cost of oil, the profits of the oil industry were 
transferred to other industries. Thus, the 
unprofitability of the latter was masked. This was 
done through the appointment of low oil prices, the 
collection of high deductions in favor of the 
People's Commissariat of Finance. They proposed 
to eliminate this design defect, according to I.M. 
Gubkin and V.I. Frolov, and for the next 2-3 years, 
the oil industry would receive financial assistance 
from the state in one way or another. At the same 
time, the authors noted that the costs in the oil 
industry were “the most advantageous costs from 
the point of view of the entire national economy 
interests”. 
Insisting on the need for oil industry reconstruction, 
the Scientific and Economic Bureau of the Oil 
Industry Council drew attention to the need to 
ensure close ties between the practical goals of the 
oil industry and science. The attenuation of experts' 
attention to research on the oil industry, which was 
recorded by experts (the activity of SORI was 
meant) was called upon to be assessed as “a 
negative and harmful phenomenon”. Likewise, the 
difficulties that oil refiners faced when traveling 
abroad were assessed negatively: “The case of 
studying the success of foreign technology in the 
oil industry cannot be considered as the fact that 
several people have had short-term business trips 
over the past 2 years”. 
Int. J Sup. Chain. Mgt  Vol. 8, No. 6, December 2019 
788 
 At the same time, the authors of the report insisted 
that the following measures should be taken to 
streamline the supply of petroleum industry 
materials and equipment and its financial situation: 
to ensure the acceleration of application passage for 
import trusts, timely processing of import 
contingents of trusts; in order to simplify the 
implementation of licenses, the fast organization of 
special departments at Trade Representatives was 
required if a more radical resolution of the issue 
would not have been possible for the leadership of 
the Supreme Economic Council. 
Thus, the Council of the Oil Industry not only 
carried out the analysis of the industry, outlined the 
prospects for its development at its meetings, but 
also made independent and very ambiguous 
decisions. It is not surprising that the fate of the 
Council was not simple. I.M. Gubkin had to speak 
out in his defense more than once. On June 30, 
1927, the Presidium of the Supreme Economic 
Council of the USSR decided to recognize the 
expediency of the SNP elimination, to transfer its 
publishing activities to the Scientific Research 
Petroleum Institute. 
However, the oil experts and Nefteesindikat 
“remained unconvinced” and categorically objected 
to such a decision by sending a corresponding letter 
to the Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council 
of the USSR V.V. Kuibyshev.  
On September 16, 1927, the Decree of the 
Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council on 
the liquidation of the Council of the Oil Industry 
was canceled, but the oil trusts and Nefteesindikat 
were offered to join the Council of Congresses of 
Industry and Trade as members and organize an Oil 
Section named the Council of the Oil Industry. 
But the Council continued to demonstrate a certain 
independence, which was impossible during the 
early 1930-ies. On June 29, 1933, the Ordinance 
was issued on the Main Directorate of the Oil 
Industry which referred to the liquidation of the 
Scientific and Technical Council of the oil industry 
by the order of the NKTP № 564 on 06/19/1933. In 
the future, oil trusts and design organizations were 
invited to send projects for examination to the 
relevant sectors: the projects of refineries and oil 
storage facilities to the Plant sector, the projects of 
the Fisheries and oil pipelines to the Crafts sector. 
 
4. Discussion 
focuses on the significant role of imported 
equipment and supply chain strategy in the 
technical re-equipment of the oil industry during 
the 1920-ies: pipes were imported from Germany, 
welding equipment was purchased in the United 
States, and some motors for pumping stations were 
bought in England and Germany. However, the 
archival documents that we studied allow us to 
state that there was import share decrease, which 
was caused by the rapid release of special 
equipment by the Soviet industry, and the 
introduction of own developments. Technical re-
equipment of the oil industry was the first and 
fastest in the industry of the USSR. The economic 
efficiency of the industry reconstruction was high, 
the pace was explained by the relative 
independence of its leadership, as well as by export 
orientation, significant funds obtained from the 
export of oil and oil products. In 1923, heat 
treatment of bits was introduced. In 1924, the 
engineer M.A. Kapelyushnikov invented and tested 
a single-stage gear turbo-drill. At the initiative of 
scientists and expert’s tremendous work was 
carried out in 1923-1924 to turn to mechanized 
methods of oil production - deep pump and 
compressor. In October 1925, the production of 
domestic deep-well sucker-rod pumps began at the 
plant named after F.E. Dzerzhinsky in Baku. In 
1924/25, their mass production started at the plant 
named after Lieutenant Schmidt. The Izhora plant 
also became the manufacturer of deep pumps, 
which had launched mass production of deep 
pumps by August 1925 for the needs of the oil 
industry. 100-120 units were produced for Azneft 
per month. During the fall of 1925, the works were 
carried out to expand the production of pumps, 
with the goal of bringing their output to 800-850 
units per month. By 1927, Soviet industry was able 
to satisfy the demands of the oil industry in such 
pumps fully. This was a kind of technological 
revolution in oil production, which occurred very 
quickly and had significant consequences - first of 
all, cost was reduced. Another component of the 
coup in oil production during the 1920-ies is 
represented by the radical changes in the technique 
and technology of drilling: the rotational method of 
drilling was replaced by the shock method. The 
import of drilling rigs decreased every year: 
1925/26 - 178 pcs., 1926/27 - 73 pcs., 1927/28 - 28 
pcs. This dynamics demonstrates the results of the 
course taken for import substitution, however, 
carried out then at a relatively slow pace. 
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5. Conclusions 
The categorization of several types for uncertainties 
in the supply chain such as demand, quality, 
broader variety, time, and customization of a 
product are related to the decision-maker. 
Management of uncertainties applicable with the 
help of sharing the information creates visibility 
among supply chain partners. Thus, the studied 
archival materials allow a deeper study of the oil 
industry evolution problem in the 1920-ies, the 
forms and methods of its management, to evaluate 
the results of the activity and the role of the most 
prominent specialists who were the members of the 
Petroleum Industry Council at that time. 
In the context of the crisis, isolation of the country, 
its political and economic fragmentation, almost 
complete loss of control levers, low competence of 
new managers, a way out of the catastrophic 
situation in the economy was seen in the 
organization of powerful economic enterprises - 
production and purchasing trusts and syndicates. In 
the 1920-ies the system of party-state management 
of industry and branch science was formed and 
constantly reorganized. The factors that caused the 
restructuring of this system were new tasks related 
to the liberalization and decentralization of 
economic life within the framework of the NEP, 
which required the presence of a larger number of 
competent employees, clear functional distinctions. 
At the same time these reorganizations 
demonstrated not only a certain vector of economic 
development, but were also the consequence of 
limited financial resources and the need for speedy 
recovery and reconstruction of the oil industry, 
which was largely export-oriented. During this 
period, greater centralization of management was 
observed in the oil industry, private capital was 
practically not allowed, cost accounting was 
implemented to a minimum extent. Only oil trusts 
were to transfer all products to the industry 
syndicate. 
The documents of the Council of the Oil Industry, 
which has a certain independence, allow not only to 
evaluate the colossal efforts to restore and re-equip 
the industry, but also its importance for the 
development of the entire national economy in the 
context of the new economic policy 
implementation. The Council of the Oil Industry 
discussed the most pressing problems: results, 
plans, their adjustment was carried out, the search 
for the most effective implementation mechanism 
was performed. The issues of industry management 
optimization were also discussed. However, his 
proposed projects on greater independence of trusts 
during the late 1920-ies did not correspond to the 
course for forced industrialization any longer. 
Archival documents also make it possible to 
formulate the conclusion that by the end of the 
1920-ies own research and development for the oil 
industry was represented by a fairly voluminous 
list. 
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